I. INTRODUCTION
Almost thirty years ago, Robert Condlin wrote an article discussing the frustrations of students in his Negotiations class.
1 He noted that his law students saw legal argument in negotiation primarily as a source of vexation rather than resolution. In the twenty-plus years I have taught negotiations, I have heard the same thing many times. Students will prepare and research and then be disconcerted when their negotiating partners are not swayed by their brilliant legal arguments. One comment by a student in a paper discussing his team's preparation for negotiation shows the initial thought process in a domestic relations negotiation: "It was important for us to focus primarily on real life situations, research some of the law, and use it against Trudy." When this preparation produces results, students are happy; when students feel they are being "stonewalled" despite their superior legal position, they are less so.
In my Negotiations class, students receive points for achieving their clients' interests. These points are then tallied for a score that will contribute to their rank against the other student teams negotiating on the same side of a case.
2 Their frustration most frequently expressed concerns other students' caring about only points and unwillingness to discuss the facts and the law. This can never be entirely true, because without the facts and the law, there is no basis for trading points.
3 I always assure my students that even in the "real world" of legal practice, negotiated outcomes are not necessarily dictated by the law and the facts. Other factors often contribute to a dispute's resolution outside of court. There are almost always students who assure me that I am wrong-that in the "real world," lawyers will always make decisions based solely on law and facts.
I am not surprised that law students believe this notion; the bulk of their legal education is spent discussing appellate decisions and picking them apart to determine what facts are key and how legal rules are derived. There is relatively little discussion of contextual factors-clients, money, time, emotions, juries, etc. 4 Then I come along and tell them there are virtually no rules governing negotiations and that they are not bound by the law, except to the extent that they may not reach an agreement that actually violates the law. This paradigm may give them a little too much freedom and is one in which they are not used to working.
Thinking that it might be useful to have some real-world support for what I tell my students, I decided to ask some "real" lawyers what dictates the outcome of their negotiations. I created a relatively simple survey on SurveyMonkey and sent the link to a variety of lawyers. 5 The results form the basis of this article and confirm my hypothesis that legal authority is not necessarily the determining factor for negotiated outcomes, though it certainly plays an important role, especially in the preparation phase of negotiations.
II. THE QUESTION
An issue that has been the subject of discussion and debate in alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") scholarship is the degree 3 Charlie Craver responds to these complaints by telling his students to just write numbers on a piece of paper and trade them. The students quickly realize that they have nothing to talk about if all they can talk about are numbers.
4 I like to think that the changing demands on legal education are making this statement less true than it used to be. Twenty years ago I wrote an article expressing my frustration with legal education in this regard: Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57 (1992) . 5 The sample included Chapman School of Law alumni, as well as lawyers from various areas of practice in California and Chicago who have volunteered to judge law school competitions.
to which negotiation and other forms of dispute resolution function as part of the litigation system. Is ADR really an alternative, or is it simply a more informal part of litigation? One commentator observed that "[r]ecent court decisions suggest that at least some jurists have embraced a new vision of the objectives of the justice system, a vision in which the purpose of legal dispute resolution is to achieve social harmony, rather than to assess factual and legal claims and articulate public norms." 6 Others note a contrary perspective:
Because few companies have made a serious commitment to ADR as a distinct system, and because there are very few rules governing it, the procedure is often allowed to become a litigation look-alike. Whenever that happens, the cost of ADR begins to approach the cost of the litigation that it's supposed to replace.
7
[T]he contending parties often waste prodigious quantities of time, money, and energy by reverting almost automatically to the habits of litigation. As happened in the [previous example], lawyers make repetitious presentations of facts and legal arguments as if they were appearing before a judge rather than an arbitrator.
8
Yet another commentator observes that "lawyers' negotiations are and should be conducted within the 'shadow of the law. '" 9 And another looks at the reconciliation of differences for the purpose of maintaining interpersonal harmony. " [T] he element of reconciliation does not necessarily preclude a powerful role for principles, rules, and precedents, although it may transmute the manner in which they operate." 10 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has long been a strong voice for the idea that ADR ought to offer real alternatives and focus on the broader needs of parties, not just their legal entitlements:
Our legal system produces binary win-lose results in adjudication. It also produces unreflective compromise-'split the difference' results in negotiated settlements that may not satisfy 6 Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 192 (2003 REV. 637, 645 (1976) . the underlying needs or interests of the parties. Human problems become stylized and simplified because they must take a particular legal form for the stating of a claim.
11
It is almost axiomatic, for those of us who teach ADR, that agreements that meet the needs and interests of the parties are more likely to be followed and avoid further disputes along the way.
12 Examining the needs and interests of the parties requires both a different sense of what is relevant to resolving a legal dispute and a different set of communication skills. As MenkelMeadow has noted:
To the extent that settlement activity seeks to promote consensual agreement through the analysis of the point of view of the other side, it requires some different skills and a very different mind-set from what litigators usually employ. Thus, the issue is whether judges and lawyers in the courts can learn to reorient their cultures and behaviors when trying to settle cases or whether those seeking settlement continue to do so from an adversarial perspective.
13
The use of ADR may require some skills other than advocacy. For lawyers and judges who have been taught to argue, criticize, and persuade, rather than to listen, synthesize, and empathize, some changes in behavior will be necessary. Adversarial practices may be problematic in settlement not only because of the obvious risk of stalemate and hostility, but also because extreme positions most often produce unprincipled compromise even if a settlement agreement is reached. 14 In summary, by using substantive strategies such as exploring shared interests, by exploiting value differences in needs, by looking to third parties, by sharing, by aggregating or disaggregating, by neutralizing, by seeking substitute goods, by exploring long-and short-term values, and by using other specific devices a greater number of solutions may be found. In addition, the particular solutions may be better and the parties may be more likely to have all or a greater number of their total needs satisfied.
15
Menkel-Meadow also points out the limited remedies available in litigated disputes-essentially, money and injunctive relief- The upside-down nature of allowing litigated results to dictate negotiated results was summed up very neatly by Menkel-Meadow: "In effect, the ten percent of cases which are tried control the types of solutions which are achieved in the other ninety percent of cases."
17 Nevertheless, legal dispute resolution negotiations do occur in the shadow of the courts, and so legal argument seems like a natural place to start negotiating.
In his article, Condlin noted that his students were frustrated by the lack of power of their legal arguments: "After their first dispute negotiation [,] law students report that legal argument never convinces anyone."
18 He argued for the importance of good legal argument in negotiations: "While argument is not all of negotiation, therefore, it is an essential part, and it is anomalous that students and lawyers report as they do."
19
Condlin offered several justifications for the importance of legal argument in negotiations: "A settlement is attractive or not primarily in comparison with alternative dispositions. . . . Since a court will apply the law, the parties must be able to predict that application. . . ." 20 Condlin continues:
If a party accepts a settlement based on an incomplete consideration of the relevant legal claims, the justice of that settlement is in question. The absence of good legal argument increases that risk. . . . In a legal system that is itself just, the justice of negotiated outcomes exists, at a minimum, to the extent the parties' competing legal claims are competently raised, debated, and resolved. Of course, the foregoing comments assume that justice is determined by law-the truth is that fairness is a highly subjective concept, and what is fair or just between two disputing parties may turn on many things. Ultimately, the parties' perceptions of justice are probably more important than some "objective" concept of justice based on legal principle-at least to the extent that serving the parties' ideas of justice minimizes the risk of further dispute. One of the inquiries students always make about negotiations is how to figure out what a case is "worth." There is a simple formula that suggests that a case should settle for an amount that is the product of the likelihood of success multiplied by the probable verdict.
22 Both sides of this equation require the kind of prediction referred to above: what would a court do with this dispute? Where the calculation gets complicated is in the sheer number of variables that go into the calculation of both likelihood of success and likely verdict. There are simply too many human and non-legal factors that influence these variables: the quality and credibility of witnesses, the quality of advocacy by counsel, the judge overseeing the litigation, the jury making the ultimate decision, the litigation and opportunity costs, the risk-averseness of the parties, and the availability of evidence. Condlin describes some of this difficulty:
Awareness of where one would like the court to come out distorts one's perspective and makes objective prediction difficult. Preparatory research done from this perspective gives unwarranted salience to arguments for (rather than against) one's position, and makes the conclusions of that research less trustworthy. And important factual data necessary to making the prediction are often within the control of the adverse party and thus unknown. Because the possibility of unrealistic prediction is high and known to be so, a negotiator is almost compelled to argue law.
23
Experts advise considering the best alternative to a negotiated settlement, or BATNA. 24 In other words, what is the best thing that can happen if you don't settle? We also tell students to consider the WATNA (worst alternative to a negotiated agreement), and I add the MLATNA (most likely alternative to a negotiated 22 So, for example, if there is an 80% likelihood of winning a $100,000 verdict, the case should settle for $80,000. Condlin goes on to explain how he thinks legal argument can influence negotiated outcomes:
Argument can influence a decision to settle in at least three ways. It can be true, recognized as such, and produce concessions out of fully informed agreement. It can be unrebuttable within the time frame of the negotiation, though not believed, and produce concessions out of deference to greater skill. Or it can be invincibly sincere and strongly felt, though patently wrong, and produce concessions out of a desire to avoid irrational and uneconomic deadlock.
25
Some argument is successful because it is undeniably true, but most produces doubt that is not removable within the time frame of the negotiation. A negotiator may not agree with an argument, may even believe that it is wrong, but unless he can explain how the argument fails, he will feel compelled to defer to it in some significant way.
26
Condlin also broached the need for a study of actual negotiations to test the hypotheses he put forward.
27 I am not sure that my survey meets the stringent requirements he suggested for such a real-world study, 28 but it is perhaps at least an introduction to understanding how negotiation and law co-exist in practice.
III. THE SURVEY
Here are the questions I asked my sample of lawyers. I tried to keep the survey simple so it could be completed in a few minutes and thus hopefully enhance the likelihood of a greater response rate. There are no doubt other useful questions that could have been asked, but I was looking for the answer to one particular question: where does legal authority fit into the world of legal negotiations?
1 Please make any comments related to the subject matter of this survey that you would like to share.
IV. THE RESULTS
One hundred ninety-seven lawyers from various practice areas responded to the survey. 29 As can be seen from the questions above, I wanted to determine whether years in practice, number of negotiations, or type of practice might influence the degree to which law dictates negotiated outcomes. As can be seen in the following tables and charts, the results are relatively, but not entirely, consistent across all these measures; legal authority plays a role, but it is not the most important determinant of negotiated outcomes. About 60% of all the respondents say legal authority does not play a primary role in determining negotiated outcomes. It generally ranks second or third among the choices I offered. It does, however, play a large role in the preparation for negotiation.
A. Years in Practice
Across the board, lawyers at varying levels of experience report that learning the law plays a significant role in preparing for negotiations, with nearly 87% of the total sample answering yes to that question. The importance of preparation to negotiation can hardly be overemphasized. 30 As Craver notes, prepared lawyers are successful negotiators, and understanding the law is a significant part of preparation.
Negotiators who consistently obtain above-average results are usually well prepared individuals who can forcefully advance their positions. They logically analyze the relevant factual circumstances and operative legal principles to determine the optimal results attainable through the bargaining process.
31
Individuals who carefully prepare for bargaining interactions tend to achieve more beneficial results than persons who do not. They ascertain the relevant factual, legal, economic, political, and cultural issues in recognition of the fact that knowledge is power. They work with their clients to determine the true underlying needs and interests of those persons. They try to develop different options that could effectively satisfy those 29 The survey was sent to just under 1900 lawyers, so the response rate is just over 10%. 30 underlying needs and interests to enable them to explore different alternatives when they meet with opposing parties.
32
Thoroughly prepared bargainers generate better results than their less prepared cohorts. They establish elevated, but realistic, aspirations for each significant item to be exchanged. They plan raised, but "principled," opening offers to help them anchor the initial discussions, and they develop confidence in their own positions. They are able to establish rapport with their opponents and create positive bargaining environments. They are persuasive and effective communicators and have the patience and perseverance needed to achieve mutual accords under seemingly difficult circumstances.
33
It is somewhat surprising that younger lawyers, those with ten or fewer years of experience, report a lower level of importance for learning the law in preparation for negotiation, at least in terms of the percentage of negative responses to the question, than do more experienced lawyers. The idea that legal rules dictate the outcomes of disputes is, after all, how law graduates have been trained to think, and they will likely have less legal knowledge already stored for use in negotiations. Perhaps the more experienced lawyers simply know more of the applicable law and so it automatically factors into their preparation, but it is difficult to explain why 17% and 20% of junior lawyers report less importance for the law at the preparation stage of negotiation, while 0% and 11% of more senior lawyers report the same view. Given the sample size, and the variety of practice areas involved, there is probably not a hugely significant meaning to draw from this result, but it might make for some interesting follow up study.
Law and Negotiations
Would you say that learning the applicable law plays a significant role in your preparation for negotiations? With respect to the question of whether legal authority determines negotiated outcomes, there is an approximately sixty-forty split in the total sample in favor of law not playing a primary role in determining negotiated outcomes. It is again interesting that younger attorneys seem to give somewhat less deference to legal authority in negotiating than do more experienced lawyers. This response is consistent with the result above relating to preparation, but it again seems surprising given the training law students receive.
Would you say that legal authority plays a primary role in determining the outcomes of your negotiations? Here are some of the explanations offered for how legal authority enters the conversation in negotiations:
0-5 YEARS (OF 38 RESPONSES)
"Legal authority comes up in all phases of a negotiated plea in a criminal case. From whether someone is eligible for diversion in a PC1000 or Prop 36 case to whether a motion to suppress evidence is won or lost to whether the new sentencing realignment under PC 1170(h) makes someone eligible for 'county' prison or state prison now. The statutes and case law interpreting those provisions are constantly cited and relied upon to persuade opposing counsel or the judge that the law is on your side." "Used extensively in determining how strong a position to take. Used also when deciding which concessions to give (i.e. an unsettled area general equals more concessions)." "I do not feel comfortable making an offer/counteroffer without supportive legal authority. I do not take offers for settlement seriously without supportive legal authority." "I use legal authority to determine where my starting points are going to be. Generally if there is legal authority in relation to a certain issue, it makes the negotiation much easier, as there is less question as to how the courts will decide an issue." "I rely on legal authority in order to help determine liability and estimate damages exposure." "Analyzing the relevant legal authority is critical in order to assess the strengths or weaknesses of your position/claim/case. Understanding the strengths or weaknesses of your position allows you come into the negotiation with a realistic expectation of what your options would be in the event the negotiations fall through; knowing what those options are will determine how aggressive you can be during the negotiations process." "I'm a criminal prosecutor. Often, there are statutory minimum punishments for certain crimes, mandatory prison enhancements, or ways to tie the judge's hands in giving probation. If you don't know the law well enough to know these things, you will enter into 'illegal' plea bargains that don't punish the defendant as severely as the law requires. I often find that the 'counteroffers' I get from defense counsel ignore these statutory restrictions."
6-10 YEARS (OF 19 RESPONSES):
"In my experience, proposals and counterproposals are usually based on the likelihood of prevailing in court. Leverage in negotiations is achieved by persuading one's adversary that one will prevail in court if the matter is incapable of settlement." "By shoving the legal authority down the opposing attorney's throat so they know they will not win a motion for summary judgment." "I'm a criminal prosecutor, so I make offers on cases depending in large part on what the statutory sentencing range is for each charge. I'm often able to negotiate plea bargains prior to trial by making defendants aware of what the statutory maximum penalty would be after trial if they do not accept my offer." "Most of my negotiations have been in front of a judge or mediator in which the statute's application is critical." "Generally speaking, my client is only authorized to participate in negotiations with parents to the extent that it is in accordance with legal authority for their position to sustain a petition and/or offer reunification services."
11-20 YEARS (OF 12 RESPONSES):
"Legal authority is used to support the position and whether the authority cuts in my client's direction will drive the amount and likelihood of settlement." "It shows the other side that you have a good case. Conversely, it can warn you when you don't have a good case." "Most of my negotiations are probate and trust litigation related. As result, the positions of the parties are very rule driven. Coming prepared with the legal authority (statutory and case law) that supports your client's position can be the deciding factor in these types of cases. When using a mediator who is familiar with the particular area of law, knowing the legal authority is critical in negotiating the settlement as it provides the tools for the mediator to reinforce any particular terms of settlement." "Statutory authority and legal precedent play key roles; however, depending on the nature of the negotiation, financial constraints may play a more important role than legal authority." "I think that if a neutral or participant is not familiar with the law, it makes the negotiation a waste of time because the party who knows the law, stands firm to the legally realistic outcomes. However, once the parties have equivalent knowledge of the law, the law is often not what defines the outcome. I have had cases where one party or the neutral did not know the law and the mediation shut down immediately with frustration all around."
20+ YEARS (OF 17 RESPONSES):
"Depends whether it's against or in favor of my client's case. Certainly, if the legal authority was against the client in the first place, plaintiff's counsel should not have taken the case. If this is a defense case, then settlement is a must." "The elements of the offenses charged must be met, and sometimes a legal issue will determine whether the case can be made. When a legal issue is apparent, the negotiations tip in favor of the party with the legal authority and understanding of how that statute or precedent may change the outcome before a jury." "I know that I have a weak case on the facts, or the other side does. That affects what the case is worth." "The law is power. People get more realistic about their expectations when the law preempts their puffing. Lawyers with difficult clients also like to have a mediator/judge/ADR type empower them by saying, 'Well, this guy teaches this stuff and he says the law is against us on this point.'" "First, issues are separated into 'legal' and 'other'; and prior to negotiations I research both sides (or many sides) of those issues where known differing legal positions have been taken; short summaries are then reviewed one last time prior to sitting down at the table. I have found this approach to be incredibly valuable because, more often than not, my counterpart in negotiations (or both sides if I am mediating) haven't gone this far. It creates immediate credibility, and frankly can be a little intimidating for the other side who is not as prepared." These comments generally reinforce the aspects of case evaluation that were discussed earlier in the article. For the most part, learning the law is part of the process of trying to predict what a court will do and crafting arguments accordingly. The answers are also fairly consistent across the years of practice.
The Not too surprisingly, money was the factor most often cited as determining the end result of a negotiation for most groups. Bargaining power, which I intended to refer to the strength of the bargaining positions possessed by the parties, and negotiating skill, which would focus more on the lawyers, were the next factors cited (except among the group with six to ten years of experience, which narrowly rated bargaining power higher than financial constraints). Of course, as Craver notes, both bargaining power and negotiating skill are influenced by the level of preparation a negotiator brings to the table. 34 Time and emotion seemed to be viewed as less important, except among the group with eleven to twenty years in practice, which nearly evenly distributed factors other than money. I gave survey respondents the opportunity to identify other factors they viewed as important, and this is what they came up with:
"OTHER" RESPONSES 0-5 YEARS (OF 14)
• Exposure to insurance company and damages • How irrational the other side is.
• Experience! Knowledge of judicial officers and typical outcomes.
• Toxic torts generally are negotiated with a focus on the facts and the medical science. The legal issues (negligence, strict liability) are basic and generally aren't brought up unless there's a significant chance of MSJ or a unique issue.
• The particular facts of the case, including an individual's prior criminal history. • Hidden motives.
• Victims; severity of crime.
• Mediations are usually set once a theory of liability is at least arguable, and summary judgment has been denied. Complicated legal/evidentiary arguments are often pushed to the side and practical considerations take over. These include media exposure, damages, jury-types in the locale, and the level of preparedness of counsel. Above all, realistic client expectations take precedence.
6-10 YEARS (OF 7)
• I think the negotiators (sic-clearly intended to say "mediators") favor the party whose attorney will most likely use them again.
34 "Most of your respondents indicated that Bargaining Power and Negotiation Skill substantially influenced outcomes. I think that many of these persons failed to appreciate the degree to which bargaining power is generated through a thorough knowledge of the legal principles and the employment of that knowledge, and the degree to which their assessment of opponent negotiating skill reflects their degree of preparation and their ability to focus on the factual and legal issues that support their positions. You might thus wish to indicate that even though many respondents thought that legal authority did not play a major role in determining bargaining outcomes, that authority actually did play a significant role in determining bargaining power and their respect for the negotiation skill of their successful opponents." This passage was excerpted from an email from Professor Craver dated January 14, 2013, after reading a draft of this article. The email is in the possession of the author.
• Many of my cases involve insurance carriers and builders.
The case law is pretty well settled and most people who are at the table know it. It's more about reducing exposure.
• As a prosecutor, typically witness issues or other unforeseen complications on a case dictate plea negotiations. In general, applicable law and legal authority are considerations in the initial filing or issuing of a case; by the time the case has been filed and I am in a position to negotiate a plea, I am well aware of any potential legal issues and as such they have no real bearing on the negotiations. • Information that may affect a party's credibility at trial.
11-20 YEARS (OF 2)
• Reasonableness of negotiated outcome.
20+ (OF 12)
• In criminal practice, the rules of settling serious criminal matters have the need for knowledge of the legal boundaries (PC 1192.7/1192.5; Romero discretion; whether or not certain sentencing enhancements must be imposed or can be stricken).
• Lack of government adherence to acceptable scientific principles.
• How the client comes across as a witness.
• Whether parties are desirous to settle, or whether they take irrational positions.
• Potential business/reputation risks.
• Although I answered "Yes" to Question 5, that does not mean that all of the factors you list in Question 7 are not in play. All of them are. The Emotional factor is always one that has to be accounted for. A good negotiator tries to find out what the case is "really about," and that "really about" factor can be as simple as He wants his tools back and She wants that inexpensive piece of jewelry.
• Experience and skill of mediator.
• Party sophistication, geographic region, religion, sexual orientation, etc. • Preparation.
Finally, I asked the survey respondents to rank the identified factors, including legal authority in the mix. This is what they came up with: Money is still the most important determining factor (except for the group with six to ten years of experience, which ranked bargaining power highest, with money second), followed by bargaining power, and then legal authority and negotiating skill in close proximity to each other. Only the group with eleven to twenty years of practice experience ranked legal authority as high as second in determining negotiated outcomes. That is also the smallest group, so it is hard to read much into that result.
B. Number of Negotiations
It seemed likely that the number of negotiations completed would correlate with years of experience, so one would expect that the answers to questions here would track with those above. And, in fact, for the most part, they do, although there are some interesting anomalies.
For the first question, whether learning the law plays an important role in preparing for negotiations, it is interesting to note that the groups at the extreme ends of the scale, those with the fewest and the most negotiations, include the largest numbers of respondents who say that learning the law is not a significant part of their preparation for negotiation. Of course, those are the largest groups responding to the survey, but it is somewhat surprising that the group with the fewest negotiations has the largest number of respondents saying that learning the law is not significant. This again seems not to support the assumption that younger lawyers will rely more heavily on the law in their preparation for negotiation. Without detailed follow-up, there is no way to know why there is a relatively larger number of less experienced lawyers who responded "no" to this question, but the overall heavy majority in favor of learning the law in preparing for negotiations holds across the board.
Law and Negotiations
Would you say that learning the applicable law plays a significant role in your preparation for negotiations? On the last question, asking participants to rank all of the factors, including legal authority, we see perhaps the most surprising results. Lawyers with higher numbers of negotiations rank legal authority higher than lawyers who have participated in fewer negotiations. In fact, the lawyers with the most negotiations rank legal authority as the most important factor by a narrow margin, while lawyers in the mid-range rank bargaining power at the top of the list. Lawyers with fewer negotiations report financial considerations as the most important determining factor, with legal authority coming in fourth for the group with the fewest negotiations. Bargaining power is ranked fairly high across the board, in at least second place for all groups. Why does more experience with negotiation seem to lead to a greater impact for legal authority in determining outcomes? It's hard to say-perhaps with greater experience, other factors such as negotiating skill tend to become more even, so the law is left with a comparatively greater role. Again, this question seems worthy of additional study. 
C. Type of Practice
Finally, the question remained of whether different practice areas would lead to different results in terms of what influences negotiated outcomes in practice. We see the same overall importance attached to learning the law in preparation for negotiation: We see some differences in the practice areas on the question of whether legal authority plays a primary role in determining negotiated outcomes, with criminal lawyers being evenly divided on whether law plays a primary role, while nearly 62% of civil practitioners say that it does not. Given the statutory basis of criminal law, it would seem logical that plea bargaining conversations might focus to a greater degree on legal issues. And money is obviously more important in the civil context, as will be seen in the next set of charts. We see a large difference in the ordering of non-legal factors by practice area, with financial factors leading the pack in terms of importance to civil practitioners, followed by bargaining power and negotiating skill. Criminal lawyers, not surprisingly, rank money very low, and see greater importance, nearly equal, in bargaining power and negotiating skill. Given the relative strength of the prosecutor's bargaining position, it is not surprising that bargaining power takes the lead here. Finally, we see the same result when adding legal authority to the determining factors list. Financial constraints are viewed as most important by civil attorneys, followed by bargaining power, then legal authority and negotiating skill. Criminal lawyers rank bargaining power first, followed by legal authority and negotiating skill. Even though criminal lawyers rank legal authority higher than civil attorneys, it is still not the most important factor in determining negotiated outcomes. In general, I was not surprised by the answers I got. Clearly, knowing the law is an important part of the preparation process for negotiation. Equally clearly, it will form part of the discussion during negotiation. But in the end, it is not the determining factor in the outcome for most negotiators, although it does seem to play a greater role in criminal negotiations than civil negotiations. Here are some of the final comments I received from survey participants, explaining their thoughts on the role of law in negotiation.
0-5 YEARS
"I used to practice family law, and I never settled anything. Emotions were way too high and usually precluded any reasonable settlement. Once I learned what judges were likely to do, it made it a lot easier to negotiate." "Whose emotional issues are you talking about? Sometimes an attorney's ego can perpetuate a case. It is important to remember you are working for the best interest of your client not yourself. If it's the client's emotional issues or the other party, then it is surely a factor to consider." "I practice civil defense for public entities. We typically do not negotiate until after significant discovery and the filing of an MSJ, because many frivolous claims are eliminated that way and it's bad to set a precedent that our client will simply settle frivolous claims. Thus, if a case gets past the pleadings or MSJ stage, by that point, plaintiff typically has very little to lose going forward with the case. Unless we believe we're facing near-certain exposure, negotiations are usually fruitless." "My experience has been that the parties themselves often don't fully understand the concept of legal authority (or don't care) and choose to disregard/ignore the significance of it when choosing what to accept in negotiations. Also, often times, each side seems to have a case which they think is more applicable than the case the other is citing & therefore the 'legal authority' arguments tend to cancel each other out for the purposes of negotiations." 6-10 YEARS "We all pretend that the litigation path is unpredictable. However, it really is a fairly predictable path. A good negotiator (from the plaintiff's perspective) will walk opposing counsel down the predicable path of litigation (i.e., we both take a few depositions, defense files a motion for summary judgment that it will inevitably lose because we both know there are obvious disputed facts and, after spending at least 100k in fees, opposing counsel will then finally advise the defendant of its true exposure to liability with an upcoming trial staring at them in the face and will recommend that the parties attend mediation where the defendant will likely pay six figures to resolve the matter after already having spent six figures to get to that point) and recommend that the parties explore an early resolution. With the litigation path being so predictable, why not explore an early resolution (especially in fee-shifting cases)? Opposing counsel usually will not have a good answer to this question since they never want to admit the true reason to avoid an early resolution (i.e., they need to bill at least 40k before they can approach the subject of resolution). Thus, when explained in the right way, opposing counsel are typically hard-pressed to reject an invitation to explore an early resolution." "While we generally evaluate the legal issues in a settlement brief, they rarely play a significant role in the actual settlement discussions. The bottom line is what the parties are willing to accept and pay." 11-20 YEARS "Legal authority is very important come trial or law and motion, but most negotiating is based on the financial bottom line, not the strength of the legal arguments on your side." "Legal authority and financial constraints can be 1 & 2 or 2 & 1. Likewise, negotiating skill and time constraints can be 3 & 4 or 4 & 3. Bargaining power is generally a function of legal authority, financial constraints, and time constraints, so it varies from case to case and is therefore hard to gauge overall. A client who is well prepared can be brought through the emotional aspect of negotiations; however, emotional issues can be a key leverage point in dealing with opponents." 20+ YEARS "For number 8, facts, equities, victim impact are the key factors. Skill, finances and time are really non-factors." "Negotiating is highly dependent on facts and whether the other party or parties believes they can overcome the facts. The reason that legal authority does not enter into it as much is because case selection is the most important factor (from the plaintiff side) and that is where knowledge of legal authority is crucial. I don't take legally or factually weak cases as a plaintiff attorney, and as a defense attorney I know what a good outcome looks like before I get to negotiation. Occasionally, a new case will come down that changes the bargaining power but this doesn't happen too often." "All negotiations are fact based. Period! If you have strong facts to support your position you're going to be able to negotiate a good settlement; if not, the other side will know you're bluffing." "Generalizations are of limited value here in my opinion, since any given negotiation can involve significant variance in the degree of importance concerning legal issues. At the end of the day, financial considerations and constraints will almost always rule the day." "Negotiations are dynamic and revolve around dozens of criteria that need to be considered by the parties and negotiators. The law and precedent are important but at different levels for each negotiation." On a final note, and consistent with the last comment above, it seemed that there might be some utility in considering what causes disputes when looking at what helps to resolve them. In order to meet the needs and interests of the parties, we must understand what those needs and interests are, and surely they are a function of what caused the problem in the first place.
In a criminal practice, the problem is caused by an alleged violation of a criminal statute, so the causes of the "dispute" might be viewed as being more fixed than in other contexts; although the explanations for criminal behavior are certainly many and varied, the definitions of crimes are fixed and the possible solutions are limited (jail, fines, probation, community service, etc.), thus focusing the discussion of options for resolution.
Other disputes might be caused by perceived injury, although that term itself is susceptible to a broad variety of meanings: "Disputes are drawn from a vast sea of events, encounters, collisions, rivalries, disappointments, discomforts and injuries. The span and composition of that sea depend on the broad contours of social life."
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In other words, injury can arise wherever human encounters happen and for any reason that causes human upset.
Perceived injuries can be exacerbated by pride, lack of knowledge, failure to communicate, or greed. 36 Given the greater range of causes of disputes in the non-criminal context, it makes sense that there would be a greater range of possibilities in terms of what would resolve the dispute, although money tends to be a proxy for many things in that context.
The role of the lawyer in the dispute is also worthy of consideration:
[T]he lawyer as transformation agent is a critical actor, for the lawyer, in many ways, controls whether a bit of trouble or a problem will be converted into a social, legal, or political dispute. This channeling by lawyers may greatly affect, if not distort, our analysis of how useful disputes and conflicts are. In my view, lawyers both defuse and eliminate some disputes that might better be expressed as political conflicts, they exaggerate and exacerbate other disputes that could be better resolved in other ways, but they also productively and usefully structure and resolve disputes and other socio-legal relationships.
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All of these considerations are reflected in the comments of my survey participants. In the end, we are left with the conviction that negotiation is a complex and human process, dependent on whatever chemistry arises as a result of all the variables in play.
V. CONCLUSION
All in all, this limited, anecdotal study seems to support what I tell my students. Lawyers bring many things to the table in terms of preparation, persuasion, leverage, and options. They are, of course, bound by their clients' decisions in terms of what settlements they can accept. 38 But there can be little doubt that lawyers exercise significant influence over those decisions.
Lawyers are trained in the law: to find it, interpret it, and use it. So they use that training in their negotiations as well as in their courtroom activities. But given the broader range of options in negotiations, the skilled lawyer will focus on the needs and interests of the parties and gauge where there is flexibility. Does one party have greater time pressures than another? More money to throw at litigation costs or settlement? More emotional investment in a particular outcome? A greater tolerance for risk? All of these factors can be used to create bargaining leverage and ultimately craft settlements. And all of these factors are considered in the shadow of the law, and the result that will likely follow litigation. But given 37 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 MO. J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 28 (1985) . 38 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) .
that even litigation is a human process, dependent on human foibles, strengths, and weaknesses, the predictive value of the law has its limits as well. So negotiation becomes a multi-faceted process, and lawyers have many tools at their disposal. The one thing that is clear is that a mere knowledge of the law, even coupled with an ability to use it persuasively, is not the end of the analysis.
